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Are Corporate Officers Advised
About Fiduciary Duties?
By Lyman Johnson and Dennis Garvis*
This Article reports the results of an empirical study of whether and how in-house cor-
porate counsel advise corporate officers about fiduciary duties. The fiduciary duties of of-
ficers long have been neglected by courts, scholars, and lawyers, even though executives play
a central role in corporate success and failure. The study's findings, organized by type of
company (public or private), size, and attorney position, show several interesting patterns
in advice-giving practices. For example, fewer than half of all respondents provided advice
to officers below the senior-most rank. The results raise the possibility that, unlike directors
who may overestimate their liability exposure, certain shortcomings in giving advice to of-
ficers may cause them to underestimate personal liability exposure and engage in more risky
behavior than is desirable for the company itself. The Article also offers recommendations
for improved practices in advising officers about their duties.
I. INTRODUCTION-CORPORATE LAW'S
NEGLECT OF OFFICERS
Corporate law's treatment of officers is like the weather: everybody talks about
it but nobody does anything about it. Undeniably, corporate executives wield
great power and are critical to company success,1 and they generally play cen-
tral roles in corporate failure and scandal as well.' The recent spate of financial
traumas-much like the Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom scandals of a few years
* Lyman Johnson is the Robert 0. Bentley Professor of Law at the Washington and Lee University
School of Law and the LeJeune Distinguished Chair in Law at the University of St. Thomas (Minne-
sota) School of Law. Dennis Garvis is the Ehrick Kilner Haight, Sr. Term Professor and an Associate
Professor of Business Administration in the Williams School of Commerce, Economics, and Politics
at Washington and Lee University The authors thank the Association of Corporate Counsel for its
assistance with this research project, and are especially grateful to Susan Hackett and Deborah House
for their efforts. The authors also thank Jessine Monaghan for her help and encouragement, and Lynne
Barr, Robert Culpepper, Lawrence Hamermesh, David Millon, Sung Hui Kim, John Olson, and partici-
pants in a faculty workshop at Hamline University Law School for their comments. The Frances Lewis
Law Center at Washington and Lee University School of Law and the Endowment for Leaders in Law
and Commerce at Washington and Lee University provided financial support.
1. See, e.g., JEFFREY SONNENFELD, THE HERO'S FAREWELL 39-57 (1988) (proposing that corporate leaders
should be seen as folk heroes).
2. See, e.g., Scandal Scorecard, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at B1 (detailing criminal charges and inves-
tigations against corporate officers).
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ago-bear this out. Some companies are successfully navigating the current hard
times while others are struggling or collapsing.3 Often, the quality of top manage-
ment is a decisive factor in the outcome.4 Newspapers and other media reflect
society's fascination with high-profile executives, providing extensive coverage of
their achievements, derelictions, forecasts, earnings (including outsize bonuses
and severance packages), and overall lifestyles.5 In short, executives occupy rec-
ognized positions of immense economic and social influence, and their behavior
draws widespread attention in the larger cultural arena.
For all their undoubted significance, however, corporate officers receive scant
attention in .the world of corporate law. This Article examines the practices of
inside corporate counsel in advising corporate officers. Specifically, it reports the
results of a study, undertaken with the assistance of the Association of Corporate
Counsel, designed to see whether and how in-house lawyers advise corporate of-
ficers as to their fiduciary duties. Before describing the methodology, results, and
implications of the study, however, and in order to better appreciate the larger sig-
nificance of counsel's advice-giving conduct for improved corporate governance,
we place our subject in a larger context. We do so by briefly noting in this intro-
duction the way in which other key institutional actors in the world of corporate
law have chronically neglected the topic of corporate officers.
Corporate statutes typically say relatively little about officers, in contrast to
the numerous provisions addressing directors and shareholders.6 Caselaw on the
fiduciary duties of officers also is surprisingly sparse,7 especially in comparison
to the surfeit of decisions involving director duties. Important doctrinal questions
3. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the venerable investment bank, is the most striking busi-
ness failure of the autumn 2008 financial meltdown. See New York Times, Business, Companies,
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/news/business/companiesehman-
brothersholdingsJnc/ (last visited June 15, 2009). Other seemingly solid companies-e.g., Mer-
rill Lynch and Wachovia Bank, N.A.-although struggling throughout 2008, sought merger part-
ners to aven disaster. See, e.g., Bank of America to Buy Merrill, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB122142278543033525.html; Robin Sidel, David Enrich & Dan Fitzpatrick,
Troubled Wachovia Seeks Out a Merger, WALt ST. J., Sept. 27, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12
2246312342980035.html.
4. See, e.g., Susanne Craig, Jeffrey McCracken, Aaron Luchetti & Kate Kelly, The Weekend Wall Street
Died-Ties that Long United Strongest Firms Unraveled as Lehman Sank Toward Failure, WALL ST. J., Dec.
29, 2008, at Al (comparing actions of Richard Fuld, Jr., of Lehman Brothers to actions of leaders at
other banks).
5. See, e.g., Erin White, Best CEOs: The Winners, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2008, http://online.wsj.com
article/SB122971949750122237.html; CEOs of Bailed-Out Banks Flew to Resorts on Firms'Jets, WALL ST.
J., June 19, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124536271699529031.html.
6. Delaware's corporate statute contains few provisions pertaining to corporate officers, see, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 142-145 (2001), but numerous provisions referring to directors or stockholders.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141, 152-155, 157, 161, 170, 251 (2001 & Supp. 2007) (directors);
id. §§ 211-233 (stockholders). The Model Business Corporation Act contains more sections explicitly
addressing officers than.Delaware's statute, see, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. §§ 8.40-8.44 (2005)--
including a section specifying a standard of conduct, id. § 8.42-but far fewer sections focusing on
officers than on directors or shareholders. Moreover, some Model Act states, such as Virginia, have
deleted the standard of conduct provision for officers from their corporate statutes while still providing
a standard for directors. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (West 2007).
7. See Lyman P. Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1597, 1600-01, 1609-10 (2005).
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have remained unanswered for a remarkably long time, even in the leading cor-
porate law state of Delaware, and notwithstanding that fiduciary duties are a vital
component of effective corporate governance. For example, does the business
judgment rule apply to corporate officers?" What exactly are the contours of an
officer's duty of care and duty of good faith?9 What is the standard of care appli-
cable to corporate officers, the usual ordinary care standard of agents or the more
lax gross negligence standard applicable to directors?10 If officers are agents of the
corporation, do they owe fiduciary duties to shareholders or only to the company
itself? May officers consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies in the
same manner and degree as directors?"
Some light was shed on these issues by the January 27, 2009, decision of the
Delaware Supreme Court in Gantler v. Stephens.12 There the court noted that it
was a matter of first impression whether officers owe fiduciary duties identical to
those of directors.' 3 Stating that it had earlier "implied that officers of Delaware
corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, and that the
fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors ... [the court stated
we] now explicitly so hold.
14
Strikingly, the court did not mention the business judgment rule in its analysis
of claims against the officers, although it did so with respect to claims against
the directors. 5 For the latter, the court applied the usual analytical framework
of requiring the plaintiffs' claims to overcome the presumptions of the business
8. Compare Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 Bus. LAw.
439 (2005) [hereinafter Johnson, BusinessJudgment Rule], with Lawrence A. Hamermesh & A. Gilchrist
Sparks Ill, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule: A Reply to Professor Johnson, 60 Bus. LAW.
865 (2005); see also Gregory Scott Crespi, Should the Business Judgment Rule Apply to Corporate Officers,
and Does It Matter?, 31 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 237 (2006).
9. There is little caselaw describing the scope of an officer's duty of care or contrasting the duty
from that of a director. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 7, at 1600-01. The liability stakes are large
because officers, unlike directors, may not be exculpated from personal liability for breaching the duty
of care under Delaware law and the law of most other states. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)
(7) (2001) (permitting exculpation from liability for breaches of the duty of care by directors but not
officers). See also McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262, 1277 (Del. Ch. 2008) (dismissing case against
directors, but not officer, in duty of care case). As to good faith, in November 2006 the Delaware Su-
preme Court clarified that good faith is not an independent fiduciary duty but is a subsidiary element
of the duty of loyalty. See Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del.
2006). The court also stated that the fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving conflicts
of interest. See id. These developments on good faith in the director context raise the important ques-
tion of whether they will carry over to the fiduciary duties of corporate officers in the same way See In
re World Health Alternatives, Inc., 385 B.R. 576, 591-94 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008) (addressing oversight
responsibilities of officers).
10. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 7, at 1636-39.
11. Compare Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del. 1985) (stating that
directors may consider non-shareholder interests in implementing defensive measures), with Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181 (Del. 1985) (holding that directors
must exclusively advance shareholder interests in sale of control or break-up context).
12. 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
13. Id. at 708.
14. Id. at 708-09.
15. Id. at 705-06.
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judgment rule (which they did). 6 For claims against the officers, however, the
court took a different approach, finding that the allegations "state a claim that they
breached their fiduciary duties as officers." 7
Thus, whether and how the business judgment rule applies to officers in Dela-
ware remains unclear. Moreover, the court in Gantler addressed the duty of loyalty
issue, not the duty of care issue. Also, the case did not involve officer oversight
responsibilities. Thus, we continue to lack clear guidance as to the scope and reach
of officer duties of care and good faith. Relatedly, the Delaware Supreme Court also
did not address the ordinary negligence versus gross negligence standard in the care
context, as the issue was not before it. Finally, given rather significant differences in
the roles and responsibilities of directors and officers within corporate governance,
the court did not explain the reason for equating their fiduciary duties.' 8 Clearly, the
area of officer duties remains murkier than that of director duties.
Besides being neglected by legislators and judges, other influential actors also
pay little heed to corporate officers. In law schools, the key training ground for
lawyers, most casebooks accord only cursory attention to the fiduciary duties
of executives, often lumping them with the more extensively covered duties of
directors, if they are treated at all.' 9 The same is true of corporate law treatises,20
along with the many institutes, conferences, and professional meetings designed
for the practicing lawyer.2' Corporate law scholarship also has largely neglected
the role of officers in corporate governance-preferring to focus on directors
and shareholders 22 -with the result that the position of officers in corporate
affairs remains under-theorized. 23 Officers often are regarded as representing an
16. Id. at 708.
17. Id. at 709.
18. Officers, of course, are agents of the corporation, unlike directors. See Johnson & Millon, supra
note 7, at 1605-08. The usual standard of care for an agent is a standard of ordinary care or simple
negligence, not the standard of gross negligence long applied in Delaware to directors. See id. at 1631.
It is worth remembering, in the officer context, the insightful observation of Justice Frankfurter:
But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further inquiry. To
whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed
to discharge these obligations? And what are the consequences of his deviation from duty?
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943). These are highly pertinent questions yet to be
authoritatively resolved with respect to corporate officers.
19. This remains true of most U.S. law school casebooks as of early 2009. See Lyman Johnson, Hav-
ing the Fiduciary Duty Talk: Model Advice for Corporate Officers (and Other Senior Agents), 63 Bus. LAw.
147, 148 n.7 (2007) [hereinafter Johnson, Having the Fiduciary Duty Talk].
20. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 7, at 1600 & n.10, 1609-10.
21. See Johnson, Having the Fiduciary Duty Talk, supra note 19, at 148 & n.7.
22. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidencefrom the Direc-
tors' & Officers' Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 487, 516 (2007) (noting that legal litera-
ture has "given a narrow definition" to "corporate governance," a broad concept).
23. The body of scholarship devoted to addressing issues associated with corporate officers is grow-
ing but remains small. Besides Johnson & Millon, supra note 7, see Z. Jill Barclift, Fuzzy Logic and Cor-
porate Governance Theories, 6 PIERCE L. REv. 177 (2007); Crespi, supra note 8; Hamermesh & Sparks,
supra note 8; David A. Hoffman, Self-Handicapping and Managers' Duty of Care, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
803, 807-12 (2007); Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, supra note 8; Johnson,
Having the Fiduciary Duty Talk, supra note 19; Aaron D. Jones, Corporate Officer Wrongdoing and the
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"agency problem" to be solved by corporate governance,2 4 rather than being
conceived as part of healthy governance. The very executives so central to the
world of business remain conspicuous by their absence in the domain of cor-
porate law.
Compounding the lack of legal materials-or perhaps the cause of it-lawyers
themselves appear not to focus sharply on the discrete fiduciary position (and
resulting responsibilities and liability exposure) of the corporate officer. This pro-
fessional neglect is true of the plaintiff's bar, as nicely illustrated by the highest
profile corporate law case in recent years, the Disney litigation involving contro-
versial severance payments made to former President Michael Ovitz.25 Promis-
ingly, experienced plaintiffs' counsel sued General Counsel Sanford Litvack and
CEO Michael Eisner in their capacities as directors and as officers.2 6 Yet, as noted
by Chancellor William Chandler in his post-trial opinion, the legal nature of the
fiduciary duty claims pressed at trial by the plaintiffs against Litvack and Eisner
as officers was essentially the same as the claims made against them as directors.
27
Only on appeal did counsel change course, arguing for a stricter standard,28 but
by then, the Delaware Supreme Court chided that it was too late.
29
But what about the corporate bar, those sophisticated business lawyers who
work exclusively on corporate matters; do these lawyers separately attend to the
fiduciary duties of corporate officers? A pilot study of outside counsel suggested
lawyers do not routinely advise executives as to their fiduciary duties,3" thereby
reinforcing the story that corporate law and legal actors largely neglect officers.
The current Article extends the investigation by reporting on the results of an em-
Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Officers Under Delaware Law, 44 AM. Bus. L.J. 475 (2007); Douglas C.
Michael, The Corporate Officer's Independent Duty as a Tonic for the Anemic Law of Executive Compensa-
tion, 17 J. CORP. L. 785 (1992); Usha Rodrigues, From Loyalty to Conflict: Addressing Fiduciary Duty at
the Officer Level, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2009).
24. For a succinct description of how corporate law seeks to mitigate what organizational theorists
describe as the managerial "agency problem" through various governance mechanisms, see Sanjai
Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108
CoLuM. L. REv. 1803, 1809-14 (2008).
25. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27
(Del. 2006).
26. See Disney, 907 A.2d at 695. The plaintiffs were represented by the sophisticated and deeply
experienced law firms of Rosenthal, Monhait, Gross & Goddess, PA., and Milberg Weiss Bershad
Hynes & Lerach LLP. See id.
27. Id. at 777 n.588 ("The parties essentially treat both officers and directors as comparable fidu-
ciaries, that is, subject to the same fiduciary duties and standards of substantive review. Thus, for pur-
poses of this case, theories of liability against corporate directors apply equally to corporate officers,
making further distinctions unnecessary.").
28. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 36, In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006), (No. 411, 2005), available at http://entrepreneur.typepad.com/conglomerate/disney/Appellantsl.
pdf (" [Tihe business judgment rule does not apply to Eisner or Litvack acting as officers or to Russell
acting as Eisner's personal 'gratuitous agent."').
29. See Disney, 906 A.2d at 46 n.38.
30. Lyman EQ. Johnson & Robert V Ricca, (Not) Advising Corporate Officers About Fiduciary Duties,
42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 663, 669-78 (2007).
HeinOnline  -- 64 Bus. Law. 1109 2008-2009
1110 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 64, August 2009
pirical study of inside corporate counsel's advice-giving practices. This study was
pointedly designed to see whether in-house lawyers-unlike many legislators,
judges, law professors, plaintiffs' lawyers, and outside counsel-explicitly attend
to the subject of officer fiduciary duties.3" Doing so in an ex ante advice-giving
capacity is especially important if fiduciary duties are actually to influence of-
ficer conduct in a meaningful way,32 as opposed to serving only as an ex post
sanctioning and risk-allocation device in litigation.33 Moreover, inside counsel
are especially well-situated to advise officers-and possibly help curb harmful
conduct-given that they work in close contact with business executives on a
recurring basis. 
34
Part II of this Article describes the study's methodology and results, some of
which were surprising. For the most part, corporate counsel-especially gen-
eral counsel-appear to be the group of legal actors most attuned to the subject
of officer fiduciary duties. There is a fair bit of variation in advice-giving prac-
tices when assorted organizational characteristics are considered, however, and
there are some notable gaps in coverage. Part III offers an analysis of what we
consider to be the implications of our findings and includes some recommen-
dations. Overall, officers appear to be somewhat under-advised about fiduciary
duties-and about their own personal liability exposure-in a way that may
enhance risk-taking on their part, at least to the extent liability rules shape
conduct. 35 This stands in contrast to outside directors who, in being frequently
told about their duties and liability exposure by lawyers, the trade press, and
directors' and officers' ("D&O") liability insurers, may overestimate their risk
of actual liability in a way that leads to risk aversion. 36 In other words, direc-
tors and officers each may misunderstand risk but in opposite ways. Part IV
provides a brief conclusion.
31. As aptly noted by Professor Tanina Rostain, "[Wie have a limited understanding of the place
of general counsel, and more generally the legal department, inside the corporation." Tanina Rostain,
General Counsel in the Age of Compliance: Preliminary Findings and New Research Questions, 21 GEO. J.
LEGAL Etics 465, 466 (2008).
32. A somewhat parallel argument in the public arena has been made by President Obama's recent
appointee to head the Office of Legal Counsel in the U.S. Department of Justice-Dawn Johnsen-
who argues that legal advisors within the executive branch of the federal government can serve as an
underappreciated source of constraint on executive power. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing
the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1559, 1564-65 (2007).
33. See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Misconduct and the Perfect Storm of Shareholder Litigation, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 75, 81-82, 87-92 (2008) (describing fiduciary duty litigation).
34. This aspect of corporate counsel's position within a company has been noted by several general
counsel. See Rostain, supra note 31, at 471. For a helpful explanation of the many functions carried
out by general counsel, and an argument that general counsel are well situated to promote corporate
integrity, see Sarah Helene Duggin, The Pivotal Role of the General Counsel in Promoting Corporate Integ-
rity and Professional Responsibility, 51 ST. Louis U. LJ. 989 (2007).
35. A chief goal of liability rules in corporate law is to deter wrongdoing by directors and officers.
See Reinier Kraakman, Hyun Park & Steven Shavell, When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Inter-
ests?, 82 GEo. L.J. 1733, 1738 (1994).
36. See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REv.
1055, 1110-12 (2006) (noting that outside directors rarely incur personal liability for fiduciary duty
breaches due to indemnification, exculpation, and D&O insurance).
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II. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
A. APPROACH AND FINDINGS
This section describes the survey methodology used to investigate the advice
given to corporate executives by inside legal counsel. It also summarizes our find-
ings. Extending prior research examining the advice-giving practices of outside
counsel, 37 a new survey was developed to gather information regarding practices
of in-house counsel in giving fiduciary duty advice to corporate officers. The sur-
vey instrument also sought information about pertinent characteristics of the re-
spondents' employer companies so that responses could be analyzed for possible
linkages between the advice given and type of organization. This survey was pilot
tested with current and former inside counsel. The final version of the survey (Ap-
pendix A to this Article) was developed using feedback from this pilot testing.
The target population for this study was in-house corporate counsel. The As-
sociation of Corporate Counsel ("ACC"), a professional membership organiza-
tion of corporate counsel, agreed to support this study as part of its mission of
providing services and professional support for its members. Conducted in fall
2007, the ACC issued both online38 and newsletter3 9 invitations to its members
to participate in the study Data from counsel was collected by means of an online
survey,40 using a web-based service that provided applications to create and for-
mat the survey, collect data from respondents, and summarize the results.41 As a
result of these activities, sixty-six responses from in-house corporate counsel were
received, out of which sixty-four usable surveys were completed.
Of the sixty-four usable responses, twenty-six were received from counsel at
publicly held companies, twenty-seven from private companies and partnerships,
nine from non-profit organizations, and two from "other" corporate entities. As a
37. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 30.
38. The series of web site announcements included an initial notice of the study featured on the
ACC homepage, a highlighted item in the ACC News section, and a reminder notice. The online in-
vitation included in each posting was prepared as a means of generating interest from a wide variety
of in-house counsel. The announcement stated:
Be a participant in a project which seeks to gather information on whether in-house counsel are
advising their corporate officers as to their fiduciary duties. This survey, which focuses on the
interaction between corporate officers and legal counsel, addresses a serious gap in our under-
standing about the delivery of legal advice to business managers.
The announcement was first available on September 17, 2007, at www.acc.coml/feature.phpfid=1275.
It is no longer available. Each web posting also contained a link to the online survey
39. The newsletter stated:
A new project, which seeks to gather information on whether in-house counsel are advising their
corporate officers on their fiduciary duties, is underway and you are invited to participate. This
survey focuses on the interaction between corporate officers and legal counsel, and will address
the significant gap in our understanding about the delivery of legal advice to business managers.
Association of Corporate Counsel, ACC... Your Monthly Member Update, Survey: Are You Providing
Adequate Fiduciary Duty Advice (Oct. 12, 2007), http://news.acca.com/accammu/issues/2007-10-12.
html; Association of Corporate Counsel, ACC Committee News, Are You Giving Enough Fiduciary
Duty Advice? (Sept. 26, 2007), http://news.acca.com/accacomm/issues/2007-09-26.html. The news-
letter postings also contained the link to the online survey
40. Counsel were promised confidentiality, as reflected in the survey attached as Appendix A.
41. See Survey Monkey, www.surveymonkeycom (last visited June 15, 2009).
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means of controlling for organization size, respondents were asked to self-report
annual revenues in four categories. Responses were received from thirty-three
counsel in companies with annual revenues of less than $500 million, twelve from
companies in the range of $500 million to $2 billion, nine in the range of $2 bil-
lion to $10 billion, and nine from companies with annual revenues greater than
$10 billion.4 2 In examining organizational roles, usable responses were received
from forty-two general counsel/chief. legal officers and twenty-two counsel hold-
ing other positions in their organizations (e.g., associate general counsel, deputy
general counsel, division counsel, senior attorney).
. The substantive questions in the survey sought to investigate the practices of
counsel in giving fiduciary duty advice. In the first substantive question (Ques-
tion 7 in Appendix A), respondents were asked if they provide general fiduciary
advice to senior corporate officers (e.g., CEO, CFO) in their capacity as corporate
officers. As seen from the survey instrument, the question states explicitly that
we were not asking whether counsel advises senior officers in their capacity as
directors-a position many such executives also occupy-but sought to know
only about advice provided to officers as officers. In the second set of substan-
tive questions (Question 8 in Appendix A), respondents were specifically asked
whether they advised officers as to the duty of loyalty and as to the duty of care,
the two pillars of fiduciary duty. They were also asked to identify the various set-
tings in which fiduciary duty advice was given.
The third set of questions (Questions 9 and 10 in Appendix A) asked whether
counsel provided fiduciary advice to corporate directors as well as to corporate
officers and, if so, whether such advice was the same or different between the two
groups. Last, respondents were asked (Question 11 in Appendix A) whether they
provided fiduciary duty advice to officers other than senior officers, such as to
business unit or division managers or to officers of subsidiaries. They were also
asked (Question 12) about their attendance at any professional meetings where
practices for advising officers about fiduciary duties were discussed. Summary
results of responses to these several sets of questions are reported in Tables 1, 2,
and 3 below
43
The results of the survey show several interesting patterns in the responses
from this sample of corporate counsel. With respect to the first substantive sur-
vey question, more than two-thirds (67.2 percent, Column A of Table 1) of all
responding counsel indicated that they provide general fiduciary duty advice to
senior executives. This is a far higher percentage than the percentage of outside
counsel who do so. 44 Nonetheless, this means one out of three respondents of-
fers no such advice. Moreover, the level of advice-giving drops noticeably with
respect to providing guidance about the specific duties of care and loyalty, with
56.3 percent (Column B of Table 1) of respondents indicating they advise senior
42. One respondent did not report annual revenues.
43. Information on the various settings where counsel gives advice to officers is not summarized in
the tables but is described in the text. See infra Part I.
44. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 30, at 670-71.
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executives on the duty of loyalty and 59.5 percent (Column C of Table 1) pro-
viding advice on the duty of care. That advice-giving on the duty of care is no
lower-indeed it is slightly higher-than advice-giving on the duty of loyalty is
striking given that the duty of loyalty is often thought to comprise the essential
"core" of fiduciary duty and, generally, receives more attention than care, at least
for corporate directors.
45
As seen in the body of Table 1, this consistent drop-off in the giving of advice
on the specific duties of loyalty and care is seen in almost every category by which
respondents are sorted along the lines of organizational characteristics (i.e., cor-
porate status, firm size, and attorney position in organization). Thus, there are
discernible differences in the practices of corporate counsel in this sample in giv-
ing advice on the duties of care and loyalty, with more than 40 percent of respon-
dents not specifically advising officers about these key duties.
As to those settings where corporate counsel provides advice to senior exec-
utives, 77.5 percent of respondents do so in connection with compliance/risk
management and 70 percent do so in transactional contexts. Advice is provided
in litigation by 50 percent of respondents and in conjunction with employee rela-
tions by 32.5 percent. Interestingly, advice in connection with executive compen-
sation is provided by 32.5 percent of respondents, seemingly a low number, but
that may reflect counsel's view that they represent the company, not executives,
in that setting. Of course, legal advice could be offered to a senior executive in
his or her capacity as a representative of the company in dealing with lower-level
executive compensation issues.
Another pattern in the responses to the first and second sets of questions be-
comes evident when responses are categorized by organizational characteristics,
as seen in Table 1. In comparison to the frequency of responses for the entire
sample, corporate counsel in publicly held companies indicated lower rates of
giving senior executives advice about general fiduciary duties (57.7 percent), the
duty of loyalty (46.2 percent), and the duty of care (46.2 percent). In contrast,
higher levels of advice-giving on all of these matters were reported by counsel
at private companies and in partnerships, non-profit organizations, and other
organizations.
Noticeable patterns are also seen when examining responses on the basis of or-
ganization size as measured by annual revenues. Respondents in organizations in
the two smaller categories (less than $500 million in revenue and between $500
million and $2 billion) reported much higher levels of giving fiduciary advice to
senior executives than corporate counsel in the larger two categories (between $2
billion and $10 billion and greater than $10 billion), although the sample size in
45. One reason caselaw more frequently focuses on loyalty claims is that directors typically are
exculpated from liability for care breaches but not from liability for loyalty breaches. See supra note 9.
As stated by the Corporate Director's Guidebook, the duty of loyalty broadly requires a director's conduct
to be "in the best interests of the corporation ... [and] there is a variety of situations in which a direc-
tor's loyalty can be questioned." COMM. ON CORP. LAws, SECrION OF Bus. LAw, AM. BAR ASS'N, CORPORATE
DIRECTORs GUIDEBOOK (5th ed. 2007), reprinted in 62 Bus. LAw. 1479, 1497 (2007).
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each of the latter two categories is somewhat small. This finding may confirm the
earlier finding that higher levels of advice are given by counsel of private compa-
nies, given that those companies are more likely (though not necessarily) to have
lower annual revenues. Finally, when responses to the first set of substantive sur-
vey questions are examined based on organizational position, general counsel and
chief legal officers reported higher levels of giving fiduciary advice to senior of-
ficers than the overall sample-81 percent as compared to 67.2 percent-though
these lawyers too, as noted above, tail off a bit in advising about loyalty (69 per-
cent) and care (73.8 percent) specifically. Overall, the practices of corporate coun-
sel in giving fiduciary duty advice to senior executives show marked differences
when organizational characteristics are considered.
The third set of survey questions focused on identifying whether respondents
advised directors as well as senior officers and, for those who do, on comparing
the fiduciary duty advice given to senior executives with that given to corporate
directors. In comparing Column A of Table 2 to Column A of Table 1, respondents
indicate that they provide fiduciary duty advice to both senior executives and
corporate directors at roughly the same rates as such advice is provided to senior
executives. The noteworthy results in Table 2 are seen in Columns B and C, which
report whether our sample of inside counsel is providing the same or different ad-
vice to executives and directors. Of the forty respondents who indicated that they
advise both executives and directors, twenty-seven (67.5 percent) reported that
they gave the same advice to both groups. Similarly, when the findings are catego-
rized by organizational characteristics (where there were sufficient responses), the
majority of respondents in all categories reported that they are providing the same
advice to executives and directors.
General counsel and chief legal officers responded that they advised both se-
nior officers and directors at a significantly higher rate (76.2 percent) than did
counsel occupying other positions (36.4 percent), an unsurprising finding given
the greater likelihood that the former will interact with directors. Overall, what is
noticeable with respect to this third set of results is that although there are many
corporate counsel (especially general counsel and chief legal officers) providing
advice to both executives and directors, there is a conspicuous segment (even
among general counsel and chief legal officers) that is not providing that advice to
both groups. Also striking, given the continued legal uncertainty on certain key is-
sues associated with officer fiduciary duties46 -issues that are more clearly settled
for directors-is that the majority of respondents provide the same advice to both
groups. One possible explanation for this pattern is that counsel may provide
fiduciary duty advice at board meetings where both directors and certain senior
executives are present. A significant minority of respondents, however, provide
different advice to the two groups of corporate officials. The survey instrument
was not specifically designed to ascertain exactly how the advice differed. Re-
spondents were given an open-ended opportunity to comment further, however.
46. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
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One comment, for example, noted that directors may reasonably rely on advisors
while officers, with their constructive knowledge of the corporation, must per-
form greater due diligence before making key decisions. Another comment noted
that new directors received more specific orientation.
4 7
As to the last set of questions, Table 3 reveals that, overall, fewer than half of
all respondents provide fiduciary duty advice to managers or officers "deeper" in
the organization, such as division managers or officers of subsidiaries. Here too,
counsel in private companies provide such advice at'a higher level than do coun-
sel in public companies. General counsel and chief legal officers do not advise
subordinate officers more frequently than do other in-house counsel.
Table 3 also reveals that, overall, only about one-third of respondents have at-
tended a conference or professional meeting where the subject of legal counsel
advising corporate officers about fiduciary duties was discussed. That the figure
was even that high is somewhat surprising given the dearth of written materials
or professional meetings that address this subject. Even so, the vast majority of
counsel report that they have not attended such meetings, suggesting little pro-
fessional attention is being given to the topic. This stands in stark contrast to the
longstanding and extensive attention lavished on the fiduciary duties of corporate
directors. 4
B. EMPIRICAL LIMITATIONS
As in any empirical research, the results of our study are limited by certain fac-
tors. The most noticeable limitation is derived from the number of survey respon-
dents in the study No inferential techniques were applied in our analysis due to
the sample size. Accordingly, the percentage of sampled counsel who responded
that they are providing fiduciary duty advice to executives cannot be generalized
to the entire population of corporate counsel. While simple descriptive analysis
is appropriate in this early stage of research, this limitation would be resolved by
generating larger samples in future research. Indeed, generating a large sample
would also permit testing whether the patterns of differences in responses from
various categories of counsel is statistically significant. Another limitation of the
study is the possible introduction of non-response bias arising from counsel who
chose not to participate in the study Such counsel may hold different views and
employ different practices regarding the giving of fiduciary advice to executives
than counsel who did respond. This potential bias resulting from the lack of input
from non-respondents is difficult to overcome. It can be minimized, again, with
larger representative samples. Finally, our data reflects self-reported information
from a single source within organizations. Accordingly, there is a possibility that
responses do not reflect actual practices in those organizations. While we did
promise anonymity to all potential respondents as a means of addressing this
47. All of the open-ended comments are on file with The Business Lawyer.
48. See Johnson, Having the Fiduciary Duty Talk, supra note 19, at 147-48.
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limitation, we did not pursue other means of checking the validity of respondent
data. In future work, the validity of responses regarding advising practices can be
confirmed by seeking responses from those receiving advice (executives and direc-
tors) as well as those providing the advice (counsel).
III. ANALYSIS
The study's findings shed new light on the advice-giving practices of corporate
counsel. The study also rounds out the picture of how important legal actors treat
(or neglect) the subject of officer fiduciary duties. For those who view executives
as critical actors in corporate governance and who believe fiduciary duties are a
vital ex ante and ex post regulator of officers' conduct, knowing what is-and
is not-being done in the way of addressing officer duties is a necessary first
step toward improved practices in this area. Several observations flow out of the
study
Overall, corporate counsel appear to advise senior corporate officers about fi-
duciary duties more pervasively than do outside counsel.4 9 Inside counsel are
well suited for rendering such advice because they work closely with officers on
an ongoing basis in a variety of settings. Professional proximity may afford inside
counsel more opportunities for giving such advice and greater ease and comfort
in doing so. One respondent emphasized just this factor in stating, "I think that
weaving the concepts behind an officer's fiduciary duty into regular work con-
versations (even if not explicitly referred to as a 'fiduciary duty') can be easily
and gently accomplished and is a good reminder." In addition, corporate counsel
are often more knowledgeable about company affairs, information networks, and
company-specific business norms and protocol than outside counsel. Thus, they
are "uniquely positioned to specialize in preventive law"50
Outside counsel, especially when retained for high-end transaction work, may
serve more as "transactional engineers" than as "wise counselors.""' Moreover,
they may regard their responsibilities as running to the board of directors in such
matters or simply not believe it is their role to advise officers about their duties,
49. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 30, at 670-71 (reporting results of survey of advice-giving
practices of outside counsel).
50. JOHN C. COFFEE,JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 195 (2006). Coffee
concludes, however, that outside counsel likely can play a more effective gatekeeping role. Id. at 195,
230-31. For an argument that inside counsel have great potential to serve as corporate "gatekeep-
ers," see Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411 (2008). See also Rostain,
supra note 31. In most states, moreover, inside legal counsel are permitted to provide legal services
only to the corporate entity, thereby removing a potential conflict of interest as to who exactly is the
client. Charles W Wolfram, The ABA and MDPs: Context, History, and Process, 84 MINN. L. REv. 1625,
1650 (2000). For an example of how a lawyer's failure to comply with professional obligations when
representing both a company and a senior officer can lead to serious sanctions, see United States v.
Nicholas, 606 F Supp. 2d 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (referring lawyer to state bar for discipline for
breaching the duty of loyalty).
51. See Robert W Gordon, A New Rolefor Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN.
L. REv. 1185, 1208-10 (2003).
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at least outside the particular context for which they were retained. 2 Also, inside
counsel often are corporate officers themselves. Reflection on the fiduciary re-
sponsibilities of their own position may sensitize them to the importance of advis-
ing other officers about their duties.
On the other hand, corporate counsel do not appear to do a particularly good
job of advising non-senior officers. Overall, fewer than half of all respondents of-
fered fiduciary duty advice to officers below the senior-most rank. General counsel
did so at no higher level than other legal counsel. This is an area where advice-
giving practices should be improved. 3 It hardly needs arguing that executive vice
presidents, and the whole gamut of more junior-ranking officers beneath them,
have enormous influence over corporate affairs.5 4 There are many compelling rea-
sons why corporate officers should be advised about their fiduciary duties 5 5-
including appropriate sensitivity to possible malpractice claims 5 -and general
counsels should consider seeing to it that a greater number of officers receive fidu-
ciary duty advice, both upon being hired and on a regular basis thereafter.
Moreover, even the overall data might be interpreted more critically Although
approximately two-thirds of all respondents do advise senior officers about fidu-
ciary duties, that means one out of three respondents do not offer such advice.
Even with respect to general counsel, 20 percent do not advise even senior offi-
cers. More than 60 percent of non-general counsel do not render such advice. Fur-
thermore, 40 percent of all respondents-and 30 percent of general counsels-do
not specifically advise senior officers about the core duties of loyalty and care.
As one respondent noted, "I have never seen any of our executive officers act in
a manner that I would consider disloyal or without reasonable care. If I thought
they were acting in such a manner, then I would advise them of their fiduciary
duties." Lacking greater detail concerning the content of their fiduciary duties,
52. A recent example is seen in the advice given by attorney Robert Joffe, a partner at Cravath,
Swain & Moore, who regularly advises boards of directors: "What you can tell directors is that if they
pay attention to the law and live up to their fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, they personally are not
going to be in peril." Stephanie Francis Ward, What I Did During the Meltdown: 'You Can't Calm Direc-
tors by Telling Them It's All Going to Be OK," 95 A.B.A. J. 50, 50 (2009). Such advice, however useful
for directors, is not being conveyed to officers by lawyers such as Mr. Joffe because it is not the role
for which they are engaged.
53. Model advice for such officers can be found in Johnson, Having the Fiduciary Duty Talk, supra
note 19, at 154-55.
54. Although Delaware courts tend not to hold directors liable for misconduct engaged in by lower-
level employees, they may not so readily absolve corporate officers for similar failures to monitor. See
Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 507 (Del. Ch. 2003) (stating that directors are not expected to
discover accounting irregularities involving corporate conduct "deep below the surface of the financial
statements"); Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 372 (Del. 2006) (not-
ing that "' [m lost of the decisions that a corporation, acting through its human agents, makes are, of
course, not the subject of director attention'" (quoting In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698
A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996)) (alteration in original)).
55. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 30, at 681-91; Johnson, Having the Fiduciary Duty Talk, supra
note 19, at 155-56.
56. Denise Oliveira, In-House Counsel at Risk for Malpractice Claims, LAw360, Jari. 8, 2009, http:l
securities.law360.com/articles/81660 (noting increase in claims asserted against inside counsel in
2008) (subscription service).
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however, may make it difficult for officers to self-regulate their conduct to comply
with such duties when not being observed by counsel. Thus, even at the level of
advising senior officers, there is considerable room for upgrading professional
practices in this area.
Another striking finding is that counsel for public companies advise officers
at lower rates than counsel for private companies. Theoretically, fiduciary duties
are vital as residual protection for investors in public companies due to the dif-
ficulty of engaging in detailed bargaining with, and monitoring of, managers.,'
Alternatively, in the private company setting, some theorists contend that robust
contracting can supplant, or at least reduce the significance of, default fiduciary
duties as a mechanism of investor protection.
5 8
Whatever the theoretical debates, corporate counsel for private companies ap-
pear to display greater, not lesser, attentiveness to fiduciary duties than coun-
sel for public companies. Possibly in the private company setting legal counsel
have longer-standing relationships with officers, and also have more frequent and
closer contact with officers, each of which facilitates conversations about fiduciary
duties in a more natural, less stilted fashion.
Also, in a private company counsel may believe that they represent both the
corporation itself and its senior officers. Although some commentators criticize
in-house counsel for wrongly equating the interests of management with those of
the company,59 reminding officers of their fiduciary duties can serve the interests
of both the company and the officer who owes the duty, and can serve to mitigate
conflicts of interest. We do not know whether that explanation accounts for the
observed difference in advice-giving rates but it is certainly plausible. Whatever
the reason, counsel for public companies lag behind their private company coun-
terparts in advising officers about their fiduciary duties.
The study also reveals that two-thirds of those who advise both executives and
directors provide the same advice to both groups.60 This practice is understand-
able given that courts, law school casebooks, and most legal materials tend to
lump together the duties of officers and directors.61 At the same time, as noted
before,6 12 there is both greater uncertainty about the scope of legal duties for
I
57. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698,
700-03 (1982) (explaining divergent interests of corporate principals and agents, and how fiduciary
duty rules work to reduce this problem).
58. For a description of this view with the argument that shareholders would plan better with a
"paternalistic nudge" from legislators, see Judd F Sneirson, Soft Paternalism for Close Corporations:
Helping Shareholders Help Themselves, 2008 Wis. L. REv. 899, 914-18. Delaware permits contracting
around, or opting out of altogether, fiduciary duties in unincorporated business entities, see, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2007), but does not permit that with respect to director loyalty in the
corporation. See supra note 9.
59. William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organizationa Lawyer Represent?: An Anatomy of
Intraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L. REv. 57, 64 (2003).
60. The study also revealed, surprisingly, that about one out of four general counsel do not advise both
officers and directors. We do not know which group the various respondents do not advise or why
61. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
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officers than for directors, and officers may face significantly greater risk of per-
sonal liability exposure. 63 Moreover, officers are full-time employees and, unlike
individual directors, are agents of the company with broad authority,64 thus hav-
ing greater opportunity to help or harm the company than directors. Tailoring
advice to officers as officers, therefore, seems especially important.
Even if corporate counsel believe that they represent the company, not the of-
ficers, it is in the company's best interests to have its most influential actors clearly
understand their fiduciary obligations.65 We do not really know, of course, how
being clearly and authoritatively advised about their fiduciary duties would, if at
all, influence their conduct. Professor Donald Langevoort has noted that execu-
tives who make it to the top have strong, domineering personalities and a "deep
capacity for ethical self-deception."66 Perhaps they would be unaffected by advice
reminding them of those legal duties that countermand the pursuit of self-interest.
On the other hand, Professors Black, Cheffins, and Klausner have found that di-
rectors, who are frequently advised about potential personal liability by lawyers,
do respond to such advice and may overestimate their actual exposure in a way
that skews their incentives toward risk aversion. 67 In other words, legal advice
affects director conduct.
The factors shaping officer incentives likely differ from those of directors, 68
but it is still possible that not being advised about fiduciary duties-and about
the attendant potentially higher liability risk they face than directors69-may lead
63. The risk of actually paying out-of-pocket damages will depend on the nature and extent of the
D&O insurance policy coverage, but reputational harm, lost time, and aggtavation will be incurred.
See Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 36, at 1056. See also Seymour Roberts, Jr., Director and
Officer Insurance Policies and Proceeds, in NORTON ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAw 231 (William N.
Norton, Jr. ed., 2008).
64. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 7, at 1607. The court in the recent Gantler decision stated
that officers owe the same duties as directors, see Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del.
2009), but, as noted earlier, several questions about officer duties nonetheless remain. See supra notes
8-11 and accompanying text. Also, as officers of the company, chief legal officers themselves are
agents whose conduct can create liability for the corporation. See Grace Giesel, Client Responsibility
for Lawyer Conduct: Examining the Agency Nature of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 86 NEB. L. REv. 346,
359-63 (2007).
65. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 30, at 681-83. General counsel can more authoritatively do
so if retained by the board of directors, not the CEO. Id. at 690. Most general counsel today, however,
appear still to report to the CEO, Rostain, supra note 31, at 473, though many have a formal connec-
tion to the board by virtue of serving as secretary, id. at 485-86. Also, Professor Kim urges that counsel
for business units report directly to general counsel, not solely to the head of the business unit. Kim,
supra note 50, at 641-42 & n.265.
66. Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessonsfrom the Recent Financial Scan-
dals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 288
(2004). See also Donald C. Langevoort, The Organizational Psychology of Hyper-Competition: Corpo-
rate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 968, 973-74 (2002) (describing
how hyper-competition and high-risk strategies among executives result from overconfidence and
aggressiveness).
67. See Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 36, at 1059.
68. See Johnson, Business judgment Rule, supra note 8, at 458-61.
69. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. A chief reason for the current financial subprime
crisis is that executive compensation schemes created incentives toward engaging in risky organizational
behavior. U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner noted, "Excessive executive compensation
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officers to underestimate personal risk exposure and thereby cause them to make
faulty personal risk/reward calculations that also affect the company's well-being.
That may lead them to engage, in aggregate, in more risky behavior than is de-
sirable for the company. While legal commentary traditionally has emphasized
how faulty "upside" compensation schemes create skewed incentives for manager-
agents to engage in overly risky conduct,70 too little emphasis has been given to
the way in which better appreciating downside risk may usefully constrain overly
risky behavior by officers and thereby also serve to reduce agency costs.71 In short,
if directors overestimate liability exposure as an outcome of advice-giving prac-
tices, officers may underestimate it due to lack of advice, or at least wrongly believe
their employment agreements have wholly addressed the issue. The failure on the
extrinsic motivator front is not one of law or the liability scheme itself so much as
a shortcoming of cultural/institutional practices within corporate law.
72
The larger failure of the corporate law culture to treat officer fiduciary duties in
a meaningful way also appears in the response to the study's question about pro-
fessional meetings. Only one-third of all respondents recalled attending a meet-
ing in the past five years where officer duties were discussed. Only one-fourth of
counsel for public companies recalled attending such a meeting. Likely, few such
opportunities even exist, and probably it is for the same reason there is so little
corporate law material about officers generally: a continuing and puzzling neglect
of the subject in most quarters of the corporate law culture.
that provides inappropriate incentives .. has played a role in exacerbating the financial crisis." Stephen
Labaton, Obama Plans Fast Action to Tighten Financial Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, at Al. Executives
must, in a parallel fashion, know they personally bear downside risk-through possible liability-as
well. Without that, the organization bears risk but the individual officers do not. Growing concern about
rectifying this asymmetry of risk bearing-in essence, a part of healthy risk management-lies behind
widespread outrage over executive bonuses at struggling or failing companies.
70. See Bhagat, Bolton & Romano, supra note 24, at 1812-14; see generally LUCIAN BEBCHUK &JESSE
FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004).
71. In the delivery of health care services context, it has recently been argued that the utility gained
from increased agent care under a tougher liability standard may be offset by a decrease in perfor-
mance on less observable tasks undertaken by an agent. Martina Samwer, When Less Liability Leads to
More Care: Adverse Effects of Liability Regimes in Multitask Principal Agent Settings, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 641,
641-42 (2008). Likely, physician conduct is more observable, especially given detailed recordkeeping,
than executive conduct. See RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL TRANSFOR-
MATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION 318
(2007). Thus, it is not clear that executives could move from engaging in more observable conduct to
engaging in less observable conduct. Moreover, executives, perhaps unlike a physician in charge, are
subject to monitoring of their behavior by a superior who could reprimand them for a nonproductive
change in conduct or shift responsibility to another person. Finally, the liability standard for officer con-
duct remains somewhat unclear, see supra notes 9-10 and 18 and accompanying text, and this Article
is not addressing, as a policy matter, what that standard should be. Rather, whatever is one's normative
position on the relative benefits of tighter versus looser liability schemes, officers should, as a positive
matter, be clearly advised of their duties so they can discharge their functions on behalf of the com-
pany accordingly For another take on this issue, see Shane A. Johnson, Harley E. Ryan, Jr. & Yisong S.
Tian, Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter, 13 REV. FIN. 115,
117-18, 142 (2009) (stating that firms with lower likelihood of managerial fraud detection, suggesting
lower expected costs of fraud, are more likely to engage in fraud).
72. General counsel elsewhere have strongly urged that responsibility for determining appropriate
levels of company risk rests with them. See Rostain, supra note 31, at 473. Consequently, advising
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IV. CONCLUSION
Corporate counsel appear to be the legal actors paying the most attention to
corporate officers, to the good of corporate governance and in contrast to other
actors in corporate law. To borrow Edward Rock's metaphor of "sermons," in-
house counsel seem to be the group most likely to pass along to officers the
sermon-like pronouncements about fiduciary duties received from the judiciary,
73
if and when the judiciary issues such "sermons."74 There are, however, notable
areas for improvement. Moreover, reflecting the larger culture of neglect, the ad-
vice offered seems, perhaps of necessity, more or less patterned after the advice
provided to directors. More sustained attention should be given to the role of
officers in corporate governance, generally, and to their fiduciary duties, specifi-
cally, by lawyers, scholars, and judges. Without such attention, the sanctioning
and regulation of officers may continue to migrate to the federal government-
notably, to the SEC-and away from state law If that happens, no longer can it be
said that corporate law is wholly the domain of the states-with a federal presence
or threat, to be sure. 75 Rather, we would have-perhaps we already have-an
incomplete federalism in corporate law, with directors attended to by state law
and officers by federal law. For now, Delaware may "compete" on the officer issue
by doing relatively little, preferring to leave sanctioning of executives to the fed-
eral government under the auspices of the securities laws. Eventually, however, if
pressed more knowledgeably by plaintiffs' lawyers,7 6 state law will have to address
several open questions about officer fiduciary duties. 7 That, in turn, will more
vividly expose Delaware to what Professor Roe has described as the risk of federal
intervention.
78
Certainly one group that should pay close attention to practices in this area are
D&O insurers that ultimately foot the bill for officer liability and therefore profess
to care deeply about such "deep governance" qualities as company "character"
and "culture" in their D&O underwriting practices. 79 One key element of both
factors includes whether key officers understand the full reach of their fiduciary
officers about their duties-given that it may bear on risk/reward calculations and affect corporate
welfare-should be widely undertaken by corporate counsel.
73. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REv.
1009 (1997). Such "sermons" (judicial opinions) do little good, of course, if they stop with the lawyers
who hear them. Perhaps a better metaphor is that the judiciary is speaking to a convention of religious
leaders who then must take the received learning back to their own parishioners (officers) if it is to
have any impact. See Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners, Apostles
and Epistles, MICH. ST. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009) (describing how lawyers may fail to convey the full
moral flavor of judicial "sermons" to their clients).
74. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
75. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REv. 588, 593 (2003) (arguing that Dela-
ware faces competition on corporate law issues from the federal government); Robert B. Thompson &
Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REv. 864,
886 (2003) (noting the "dramatic growth in the role of federal law in regulating officers and directors").
76. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
78. See Roe, supra note 75, at 593.
79. Baker & Griffith, supra note 22, at 517-25, 539-43.
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obligations. Underwriting practices could be modified to require explicit officer
acknowledgement of an understanding of the standards for care and loyalty. Cur-
rently, moreover, it appears that none of the widely followed corporate gover-
nance indices include this element in arriving at overall governance ratings for
specific companies, though "director education" and "board skills" are sometimes
included. 0
Indeed, future research in this area should extend our understanding of this
important topic by gathering data from all parties to the fiduciary relationship.
Although the present study has tapped into the perspective of corporate counsel,
and prior research has examined outside counsel, the next step should involve a
survey of the recipients of advice-i.e., directors as well as top management-as a
means for developing richer data and firmer conclusions on how fiduciary duties
actually factor into the work lives of senior corporate officials.
80. See Bhagat, Bolton & Romano, supra note 24, at 1870-76.
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APPENDIX A
IN-HOUSE LEGAL COUNSEL QUESTIONNAIRE
ON GIVING FIDUCIARY DUTY ADVICE
Your identity and responses to this questionnaire will remain confidential.
Questionnaire responses from legal counsel will be collected and the ag-
gregate responses will be used in a published research paper, but without
identification of the respondents. We estimate that responding to this ques-
tionnaire will take no more than 10 minutes.
I. Background Information
1. In which city and state do you primarily practice?






3. Under the laws of what state was your organization formed?
4. What are your organization's annual revenues?
Under $500 million
___ $500 million to $2 billion
__ $2 billion to $10 billion
$10 billion or more






__ More than Thirty
6. What is your position within the organization?
__ Chief Legal Officer/General Counsel
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II. Advising Corporate Officers
NOTE: If your responses require more space than we provided, please use
whatever additional paper you need to fully answer the questions and include
those pages with this questionnaire.
7. Do you explicitly advise senior corporate officers (e.g., Chief Executive Of-
ficer, Chief Financial Officer) as to their fiduciary duties,* in their capacity
as senior corporate officers (we are not seeking now to know whether you
advise such persons in their capacity as directors, only if you do advise
them as officers)?
Yes No
*By "fiduciary duties," we simply mean do you in some manner advise officers-
in whatever way you phrase or convey the advice-that they have a legal duty to
act loyally for the company and a duty to act with reasonable care.
8. If your response to #7 was "Yes," please answer the following questions; if
your response was "No," please go to #9 and continue.
a. Do you advise senior officers as to the fiduciary duty of loyalty?
Yes - No
b. Do you advise senior officers as to the duty of care?
Yes No
c. In what settings have you provided fiduciary duty advice to senior






__ Other (please specify)
9. Asking you now about advising directors, rather than corporate officers, do
you now, or have you ever, advised corporate directors as to their fiduciary
duties?
Yes No
10. If your response to #9 was "Yes," is the fiduciary advice you give senior of-
ficers the same as or different from the advice you give directors?
__ The same __ Different (please elaborate)
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11. Do you or any other attorneys within your organization provide fiduciary
duty advice to officers other than senior officers (e.g., to business unit or
division managers, or to officers of subsidiaries)?
Yes No Don't know
12. Have you, within the past 5 years, attended a conference, seminar, or other
professional meeting where the subject of legal counsel specifically advis-
ing officers (not directors) as to their fiduciary duties was discussed?
Yes No
III. Additional Information
13. Is there anything else you would like to say in connection with offering
fiduciary duty advice to officers?
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